INTRODUCTION
New optical networking technologies have been more and more popular in recent years. They can satisfy still increasing user demands for bandwidth [1] but also have to be resilient and ensure quality of service for high priority connections. There are at least a few well-known solutions that ensure continuous data transmission in a network even in the case of link or node failures. For instance, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 802.17 standard defines Resilient Packet Rings (RPR) networks [2] . In RPR, data transmission is realised in both rings simultaneously, however, in opposite directions. When a failure occurs in the network, one of two protection mechanisms, that is, steering (mandatory) or wrapping (optional) is activated. In the first one, data is redirected to the opposite ring in the source node, whereas, in the second case, packets are wrapped to the opposite ring in the node situated next to the failed element. Because of the topology discovery protocol, which informs the nodes about the current network topology, it is possible to ensure data transmission with outages shorter than 50 ms, which is acceptable by most applications.
In this paper, we focus on the preconfigured protection cycles (p-cycles). They were proposed in 1998 as a powerful resilience technique to protect metropolitan area networks (MANs) against link or node failures [3] . Numerous past studies show the usefulness and advantages of this solution. The practical proposals, as well as theoretical analyses, have been provided to explain how this very promising approach performs. Most researchers use the (Integer Linear Programming model to find the best p-cycle configurations in a network, for example, in [4] and [5] . This simple and effective tool sometimes is used to solve very complex problems. Many new proposals regarding p-cycles have been identified in a literature. The Failure Independent Path-Protecting p-cycle that is an extension of the original concept is presented in [6] . This solution allows for more capacity efficient network design than the link protecting p-cycle. The recent work presented in [7] assumes that the combination of network coding and p-cycles ensures an effective 1 C N protection against single-link failures. The authors in [8] prove that protection by establishing optimised explicit paths allows for more effective balance of traffic in comparison to the use of optimised Internet Protocol (IP) routing. In [9] , the schemes for Multiprotocol Label Switching networks that combine p-cycle and the fast reroute mechanisms are proposed to share the protection bandwidth effectively. The authors in [10] analysed a multipath protection algorithm based on the p-cycle mechanism. The obtained results confirm that this solution is more efficient than the path-based protection concept. However, in [11] , the authors propose a new path-based multipath protection scheme to control the lengths of paths, which allows for more effective transmission in a network. The paths may also be established effectively by using the mixed shared protection algorithm proposed in [12] . There are also many papers in which authors analyse the possible advantages of p-cycles when two or even more failures occur in a network. The simple solution is presented in [13] , where two link-disjoint backup paths are computed for each link. As a result, the network is protected against two-link failures. The authors in [14] and [15] focus on the capacity optimization in a network with p-cycles when two failures are identified. In [16] , the enhanced intelligent p-cycle is proposed to protect all working light-trees of multicast demands in a network. The Quality Of Protection for networks with pcycles is analysed in [17] . The authors propose five service classes to protect links against failures. The best one, platinum class, ensures protection of all two-link failures. The p-cycles that ensure a network survivability when many (more than two) links fail have been also analysed, for example, in [18] . In the paper, a few new algorithms have been proposed to determine the number of disjoint p-cycles in the network with the same number of non-working links. In [19] , the authors consider single and multiple failures and propose the new algorithms, which minimise the capacity consumption in a network protected by p-cycles. The authors of [20] also try to optimise the process of pcycles selection. They use the integer linear programming and genetic algorithm methods to find the best solutions. The reliability analysis provides a key metric for choosing the best configuration of p-cycles in a given network topology [21] .
There are two types of link spans protected by p-cycles, on-cycle and straddling ones (Figure 1 ). In the first case, the failing link is a part of a p-cycle. The failure is recovered by redirecting the transmission through the working spans, which belong to the p-cycle. In the second case, the failing link does not belong to the p-cycle, but transmission may be continued by using the spans that belong to the p-cycle. Moreover, in this case, it is possible to set two routes for redirected traffic, which demonstrates one of the greatest advantages of p-cycles. Additionally, the proposed method is fast due to its local character of protection switching.
In this paper, we propose an analytical model that facilitates the selection of an appropriate p-cycle configuration in the Double Ring with Dual Attachment (DRDA) network architecture. Although we focus on DRDAs, the presented method may be easily extended for any other architecture. DRDAs are composed of two rings (the inner and the outer ring) interconnected via dual attachments, that is, each node in the inner ring is double linked to its associated node in the outer ring. DRDAs were introduced in [22] , whereas, this paper presents the analytical comparison between various p-cycle configurations, for the first time. We provide the reliability analysis for five p-cycle configurations and prove that the one that was proposed and analysed in [22] p-cycle configuration are presented. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
ANALYSED P-CYCLE CONFIGURATIONS
A k-node DRDA network (with 2k links) can be protected against link failures by several p-cycle configurations, as shown in Figure 2 . It presents five possibilities that are analysed and compared in this paper. In case (a), a simple configuration is considered: two p-cycles, which cover the inner and the outer ring. Figure 2 (b) proposes a different approach, that is, many (k=2) short (4-links) p-cycles (for simplicity, only one p-cycle is presented in this case). In case (c), there are two p-cycles, each spanning over the half of the network. Case (d) shows two p-cycles, both spanning through all the nodes in the network (again, only one is marked). As there is no information exchange between the p-cycles, each link failure is treated as an on-cycle failure and is repaired by the p-cycle to which this link belongs. The last approach, Figure 2 (e), presents the solution introduced in [22] , where there are two cooperating p-cycles. The cooperation means that failures can be repaired either in the p-cycle in which a failure occurs, or in the complementary p-cycle, depending on which strategy is more efficient. The cooperation is possible, due to two features. Firstly, each p-cycle traverses all nodes in the topology providing full connectivity between any two nodes in the DRDA. Secondly, p-cycles are link disjoint. The presented features of p-cycles proposed in case (e) provide a high level of protection against link failures.
In cases (a) and (c), the established p-cycles do not cover all the links. k links in case (a) are not protected. In case (c), k-4 are straddling links protected by p-cycles. It is expected that in terms of reliability, these configurations will be inferior compared to the other cases; however, we decided to include them for the purpose of comparison and a better overall view. Similarly, all the proposed configurations differ in the amount of spare capacity that is required to provide full protection. Nevertheless, in this paper, we focus mainly on the solutions' effectiveness rather than on their deployment costs.
ANALYSIS OF RELIABILITY AND REQUIREMENTS FOR DRDA NETWORKS WITH VARIOUS P-CYCLE CONFIGURATIONS
In this section, we compare the proposed p-cycle configurations in terms of achieved reliability of the network. To do that, we use commonly known analytical measures, that is, MTTF and MTTD (Mean Time to Disconnection).
Mean time to failure represents the average amount of time before the system fails. It is calculated by providing a function that denotes the probability that the network is in an irreparable state. MTTD is the average time required to transition from the original state with no link failures to the disconnection state. This gives an idea of what requirements in terms of MTTR should a network operator demand from its service repair department in order to achieve a given MTTD.
The first parameter does not consider repairs of failed links and should be treated as a theoretical reference. Nevertheless, it is a good measure to objectively compare the topologies. In reality, broken links are repaired. Therefore, MTTD is more realistic and represents the mean time after which the connectivity in a network cannot be assured, given a certain value of MTTR.
Mean Time To Failure
For the reliability calculations, we use the state enumeration method, that is, we list all possible states and the sum of their probabilities. In case of MTTF, we model the behaviour of a system as a Markov chain, where states are related to different failure situations. We assume that failures as well as repair processes are memoryless, and we take into consideration failure/repair intensities in appropriate transitions. Therefore, we use homogeneous Markov chains. The final step to obtain MTTF is the Laplace transform.
MTTF of a network with p-cycles can be obtained from the following formula:
where R.t/ is an all-terminal reliability function [24] .
Equations (2) through (6) present the all-terminal reliability for p-cycles presented in Figure 2 .
The (0:0) symbol describes the situation where there is no failure in a network. The (1:0) symbol indicates one failure in one of the p-cycles and none in the other. The remaining symbols are created in a similar way. Only the cases with all working links and those with failures that may be protected by p-cycles are considered in formulas 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. In the formulas, k means the number of nodes, 2k represents the number of links and r.t/ is the reliability function of a single link.
In case (a), we create two p-cycles, one spanning over the inner ring and one spanning over the outer ring. The all-terminal reliability function can be constructed as in Equation (2) In case (b), we make k=2 4-link long p-cycles. In this scenario, all links are protected. The all-terminal reliability function can be constructed as in Equation (3) 
In case (c), there are two cycles, both traversing half of the network. The all-terminal reliability function can be constructed as in Equation (4). In each p-cycle, up to 1 oncycle link and any number of straddling links may be down. The same layout as in case (d) is used in case (e), but here, both p-cycles cooperate. Similarly, all links are protected. The all-terminal reliability function can be constructed as in Equation (6) . In this case, we have two p-cycles. In each p-cycle up to k links may be down; however, at that time, only up to 1 link may be down in the other p-cycle. To obtain the exact values of MTTF of a network, the reliability function of a single link r.t/ needs to be known. However, as most of link failures are generated by cable cuts, and the ageing or other physical processes can be neglected, span failures are generally memoryless, thus characterised by a Poisson process with the rate . Therefore, inter-failure times can be described by an exponential distribution with the average value MTTF˛D 1= , where MTTF˛represents the MTTF of a single link. Although this value is related to the span length, to simplify the calculations, we consider equal link lengths, therefore equal MTTF˛values for each link.
The MTTF of the network considered in the paper, as a function of the number of nodes in the DRDA topology for the cases presented in Figure 2 (numbers written in bold show the best results) without repairs is obtained following Equations (7)- (11) . The results that show the MTTF of the considered topology with p-cycles as a part of link MTTF˛are presented in Table I and illustrated in Figure 3 .
As we can see, the worst results are observed for case (a). In this configuration, the 'dual attachment' links (joining the inner and outer rings) are not protected. Therefore, each failure cannot be repaired, and the connectivity cannot be assured. This situation was partially and fully eliminated in cases (c) and (d), respectively, where p-cycles protect more/all links in the DRDA network. Because of that, the MTTF is greater in those cases compared to case (a).
The case (b) shows that many smaller p-cycles work better than in cases (a), (c) and (d). This observation is consistent with our presumptions. If we have more p-cycles, the number of links that may fail at the same time without loosing connectivity in a network is greater. As a result, the MTTF for such configurations is usually better. On the other hand, the best results are observed for case (e), with two interacting p-cycles proposed, if the number of nodes in the network is lower or equal to 32. The size of a DRDA network composed of 32 nodes may be very large (it depends on span lengths). In this case, the best MTTF values are observed because the p-cycles cover all nodes in the network and they protect links in a coordinated way (each link is protected by both p-cycles).
Based on the results, we can conclude that for small DRDA networks (up to 32 nodes), the p-cycle configuration shown in Figure 2 (e) is the best solution. However, for larger networks, providing many 4-link long p-cycles gives better results in terms of MTTF. It is more probable that in larger networks (composed of numerous number of nodes) with only one or two p-cycles covering all nodes, two or more failures occur at the same time in the p-cycle. If we have more p-cycles in the same network, the probability of disconnection is lower. This observation is characteristic to p-cycles in general, as they are not supposed to span over numerous hops [25] .
Mean Time To Disconnection
As noted in [22] , the following analysis assumes that links in the DRDA happen to fail independently. Now, links are assumed to be repaired by the network operator following again the exponential distribution with rate . Now, 1 is referred to as the MTTR. The target is to find the Time To Disconnection probability distribution function of a generic k-DRDA topology and derive its MTTD average value. We assume that an observed average link failure value of Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) is given and that the network operator can guarantee a certain average link repair time given by its MTTR value.
To simplify the model, no more than four link failures are assumed to occur simultaneously, which is highly improbable (actually less than 10 6 for MTBF D 60 days and traditional MTTR values of hours and days [22] ).
With these assumptions, a given k-node DRDA can be easily characterised and analysed with respect to its reliability by Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) [26] . Figure 4 shows the CTMC for the different p-cycle configurations proposed in Section 2, which can be read as follows. The generic state .n 1 : : : : : n i : : : : : n f .k/ / gives the number of failures on the different p-cycles, together with the required units of backup capacity C b for that state. For instance, the state labelled (2:1) means that two of the k links of one p-cycle have failed together with one of the k links of its dual p-cycle. In such a case, 3C additional units of backup capacity are required.
The diagram in Figure 4 also gives the transition probabilities between states. For instance, transition from state (0:0) to state (1:0) occurs with rate 2k , because this transition occurs when any of the 2k links of the two p-cycles fails. Transition back to state (0:0) occurs with rate , which refers to the rate at which such a failure is fixed. For instance, transition from state occurs with rate k (any of the k links of the dual p-cycle fails), whereas the transition rate to state (2:0) is .k 1/ (any of the k 1 remaining links of the current p-cycle fails). Again, transition back from state (2:1) to state (2:0) occurs with rate 1 , which refers to the fact that the failure on the dual p-cycle is recovered. The same reasoning applies to the rest of state transition rates. Finally, the state Disconnection is absorbing in the CTMC (there is no transition from this state to any other) and, when reached, this state implies that some nodes in the DRDA are isolated (disconnection state).
To compute the Time To Disconnection probability distribution from initial state .0 : : : : : 0/, it is just required to choose the entry (.0 : : : : : 0/, Disconnection) in the matrix A.t/ D e Gt where A.t/ gives the distribution function of the passage time between any two states of the CTMC within the time interval OE0, t, and matrix G is the transition probability matrix for this chain. Figure 5 shows the MTTD values for different k-size DRDAs (varying from k D 8 nodes to k D 64 nodes), for MTBF D 60 days and MTTR D 1 day. It is worth noting that k must be a multiple of 4 in order to define the two dual p-cycles. First of all, there is a decreasing trend of MTTD with respect to k, as when there are more links in the network, the probability of failure grows significantly. Moreover, in case (e), the transition probability to the disconnection state depends on the number of nodes, whereas, in case (b), this probability is constant (Figure 4 ). This shows that p-cycle configuration as proposed in case (e) is suitable only for smaller networks. For instance, an 8-node DRDA, using a collaborative p-cycle, shows MTTD D 577 days, whereas a 32-node DRDA gives a much smaller MTTD D 15 days.
Concerning different configurations, it can be observed that the obtained results are similar to those presented in the previous section. That is, the worst case is (a), where two p-cycles without cooperation are considered. If the number of nodes in the topology is small (less than 24), the most resilient solution (in terms of MTTD) is case (e), where two dual collaborative p-cycles are defined. However, for larger topologies (if the number of nodes is greater than 24), providing many 4-link long p-cycles, that is, case (b), gives better results in terms of MTTD.
In order to assess how MTTR influences MTTD, Figure 6 shows the MTTD for different values of MTTR and numbers of nodes, for the two most resilient solutions obtained in the previous analysis, namely, case (e) and case (b). It can be observed that case (e) is better than case (b) for every value of MTTF (in the typical range of 0-5 days) when k D 8 nodes, whereas if k D 16 nodes, both cases are similar when MTTF is greater than 2 days. Finally, when k D 32, case (b) is better than case (e) if only MTTF is higher than 12 h.
Required backup capacity
The p-cycles presented in this paper ensure that a number of link failures may be repaired and the connectivity between all the nodes is still secured. However, we need to ensure additional capacity on the selected links to serve the redirected traffic. In this section, we present the analysis of required backup capacity in single links and in the whole network.
n means all straddling links that may fail, n 1 means straddling links in one p-cycle that may fail and n 2 means straddling links in second p-cycle that may fail
The results of our analysis are presented in Table II . C b per link means how much capacity per link in each p-cycle needs to be added to serve the additional traffic if failures occur. On the other hand, the C b per network shows how much additional capacity we need to buy in the whole network to serve the backup traffic. For cases (a), (b) and (d), we need the additional C per each link in each p-cycle, which repairs a failure. Thus, there is a need for C multiplied by the number of on-cycle links additional capacity in the network. In cases (c) and (e), it is more complex to estimate the demand on capacity, which demands on the number of links we want to protect (in case (c), we may protect up to one failed on-site link and all straddling links, whereas in case (e), we may protect up to one failure in a p-cycle and all links in the second p-cycle). The recovery column shows how the corresponding failure is repaired. O-C means the on-cycle repair strategy, which is used when a failure occurs in one of the links belonging to a p-cycle; it is repaired by the alternative route on the cycle. F-S denotes full-straddling repair strategy, which is used when a protected off-cycle link fails; it is repaired by the p-cycle and the traffic is balanced over two alternative routes. S-S is the semi-straddling repair strategy, which is used when a straddling link fails but the p-cycle is not fully functional either; in this case, the redirected traffic from the failed straddling link cannot be sent over two paths, as only one is available. All the mentioned strategies have been described in details in [22] .
The results in Table II show that, when there is only one failure of on-cycle links in a network, the best results are observed for case (a) (where not all links are protected) and for case (e). In case of two failures (1:1), the configuration (a) is the best. More failures can be repaired only when case (b), (c) or (e) is implemented; however, in case (c), up to one on-cycle link in each p-cycle may fail. With the same additional capacity as in case (e), in case (b), we may protect more links. This case is also more suitable for bigger networks along with lower needs for additional capacity. The analysis shows that taking into consideration only the need for additional capacity, the (e) configuration may be worse than the other proposals under specific conditions (when not all links are protected or when p-cycles are small and have up to one failure). On top of that, the values of the MTTF and MTTD presented in previous sections are significantly greater in case (e) than for the other cases in relatively small networks. Network operators may decide by themselves, which of the analysed p-cycle configurations is the most suitable for them.
In case (e), we are also able to provide protection when more links fail at the same time; yet, this cases require much more additional capacity. However, we need to note that the sole connectivity between all nodes in the network is assured even when all links in one p-cycle fail. If we do not have enough capacity to serve all redirected traffic, the transmission will be slowed down but not disconnected. Such an advantage is not observed for the other proposals.
If we look at the example for k D 8 and assume the maximum of two simultaneous link failures in the network, we can see that for cases (b), (d) and (e), which are the most capacity consuming examples, we need to increase each link capacity twice (in case (c), we may need even more capacity when we decide to protect also straddling links). In comparison to other architectures, for example, RPR, this feature of DRDA is very good. In RPR, we also need to multiply each link capacity by two in case of a link failure. However, in RPR, we can repair two failures only if they occur between two corresponding nodes. The strong advantage of case (e) is that any two failures will be repaired, whereas topologies (b) and (d) do not present that feature. .0 : 0/ n F-S nC=2, n 2< 0, k 4 > .k C 4/nC=2
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CONCLUSION
The DRDA architecture is a new proposal for the highspeed reliable transmission of data in the metropolitan area.
In such a network topology, the protection possibilities provided by implementing several link-disjoint p-cycles are quite large. It is possible to protect each link in a topology or only a part of them. It depends on the chosen p-cycle configuration. Of course, the more links we protect, the more reliable network is. The results presented in this paper confirm this statement. This work provides a reliability analysis for the most sensible p-cycle configurations in the considered DRDA topology. In order to assess the reliability of DRDA, MTTF and MTTD indicators were used. As shown, when the number of nodes is small, two dual p-cycles with cooperation provide the best solution in terms of both MTTF and MTTD. However, for large topologies (more than 24 nodes), it is generally a better solution to split the protection rings into several small 4-link p-cycles.
The DRDAs with 24 nodes may also be quite large. Our observations indicate that ring-based networks with 12 (which corresponds to 24 nodes in DRDAs) or larger number of nodes are rarely used. The studies presented in this paper confirm that, in most cases, two interworking p-cycles should be used to protect links in the DRDA networks. It is worth to note that in this case, we protect more links in comparison to the other solutions. Moreover, even if we do not have enough capacity to serve all redirected traffic, we still ensure connectivity between all nodes. In such a case, traffic is sent only with a lower rate. Finally, the network administrators are free to choose how much additional capacity they want to inject in their networks. More spare capacity generates costs but improves reliability.
This information is of special interest for network operators when they have to deploy a protection mechanism in their MAN, which demand full-time any-to-any connectivity, such as the networks that distribute Internet Protocol television (IPTV) services.
